Amante specifically holds that "[w]hile it is possible that bifurcation of a single-count felon-in-possession trial might be appropriate in an 'extraordinarily unusual case,' Belk, 346 F.3d at 311, such as where the facts of the prior felony would be admitted into evidence and are of such a heinous nature as to overwhelm the trial on possession, this is not such a case." Op. at 6. Thus, Amante narrows Belk's already narrow exception for properly bifurcated trials (limited to "extraordinarily unsual cases") to (1) cases in which the Government, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief, is somehow permitted to introduce the facts underlying the prior felony, and those facts are particularly "heinous" or inflammatory; and (2) cases involving multiple counts, in which the felon-in-possession count itself may be bifurcated from the trial of the other counts, see Op. at 11 n.2 (citing United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 492-93 (2d Cir. 1994)). Apparently, in every other instance, a district judge is barred from ordering bifurcation.